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Abstract: Federated identity management enables users to access multiple systems using a single 
login credential. However, to achieve this a complex privacy compromising authentication has to 
occur between the user, relying party (RP) (e.g., a business), and a credential service provider (CSP) 
that performs the authentication. In this work, we use a smart contract on a blockchain to enable 
an architecture where authentication no longer involves the CSP. Authentication is performed 
solely through user to RP communications (eliminating fees and enhancing privacy). No third party 
needs to be contacted, not even the smart contract. No public key infrastructure (PKI) needs to be 
maintained. And no revocation lists need to be checked. In contrast to competing smart contract 
approaches, ours is hierarchically managed (like a PKI) enabling better validation of attribute 
providers and making it more useful for large entities to provide identity services for their 
constituents (e.g., a government) while still enabling users to maintain a level of self-sovereignty. 
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1 Introduction 
Federated identity management (FIM) enables users to access multiple systems using a 
single login credential. In industry implementations (e.g., with Amazon, Google, and 
Facebook authentication
4
), multiple entities collaborate such that one entity in the 
collaboration can authenticate users for other entities; it requires complex interactions 
to enable a user to perform a business interaction with some ‘relying party’ (RP) (e.g., a 
business) and have the authentication performed by a ‘credential service provider’ (CSP) 
(the entity performing the authorizations) [TA18]. It may involve redirecting a user from 
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an RP to a CSP and then back to the RP post-authentication with the CSP communicating 
with both the user and RP. CSPs likely will charge for this service while being able to 
violate the privacy of users by seeing with which RPs they interact. Complicating matters 
further, FIM often supports the transferring of user attributes (e.g., age) to an RP to 
support a business interaction. 
In this work, we provide an identity management system (IDMS) that provides FIM such 
that a user can authenticate and transfer attributes to an RP without the involvement of 
a CSP (thereby heightening privacy and reducing costs). We accomplish this through 
leveraging a smart contract running on a blockchain
5
. User to RP interactions do not need 
to transact with the smart contract, they simply use data from a copy of the blockchain. 
Thus, there is no need for the user or RP to wait for blockchain blocks to be published or 
to pay blockchain transaction fees. User to RP communications are extremely fast and 
free. 
Our IDMS is hierarchically managed enabling authorities to manage user accounts and 
associate attributes with accounts. However, users are granted a degree of self-
sovereignty; a user must approve added attributes and can view and delete their data. 
Privacy is maintained by either adding only hashes of attributes to user records, by only 
adding data encrypted with the user’s public key, or by only adding references to external 
and secured databases that house user attribute data. We emphasize that user to RP 
interactions are completely private, something not possible in current systems using a 
CSP for authentication. 
We implemented our IDMS on the Ethereum platform [Eth]. Charges are only incurred 
when creating and updating user accounts, which is something that is relatively rare 
compared to a user freely and regularly interacting with RPs. Also, user account update 
functions are very cheap, all costing less than $0.09 USD (as of September, 2018). We 
note that other FIM smart contract systems are in development, but ours differs primarily 
in being a managed approach that still provides a degree of user self-sovereignty. This 
provides advantages in having authoritative identity attributes for users and having the 
ability to validate attribute providers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the overall contract 
design and section 3 describes the attribute field design. Then section 4 outlines the core 
functions of the IDMS system: authenticating users and passing attributes. Section 5 
provides an example, section 6 discusses our implementation, section 7 explains why we 
use smart contracts, and section 8 enumerate achieved security properties. Section 9 
provides the related work and section 10 our conclusions. 
                                                                
5 See [Yag+18] for an overview of blockchain and smart contract technology. 
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2 IDMS Contract Design 
Our IDMS is implemented within a smart contract accessed by five types of entities: the 
IDMS owner, account managers, attribute managers, users, and RPs (shown in figure 1). 
The first four issue transactions to the blockchain to manage user accounts (relatively 
rare events). Users and RPs use public blockchain data to authenticate a user and pass 
attributes (the more common events). Both the managers and users have IDMS 
accounts. Manager data is publicly readable while user data is kept private using hashes 
and encryption. 
Smart Contract: The smart contract is modeled as being immutable; once deployed, it is 
not owned and is its own entity. Alternately, it may be coded for the IDMS owner to 
update it with participant agreement (e.g., a voting mechanism) or after a notification 
period (allowing participants time to withdraw from the IDMS if they disapprove of the 
changes). 
IDMS Owner: The IDMS owner is limited by the contract to authorize and deauthorize 
managers. For authorization, an entity creates a blockchain account, gives their public 
key to the owner, and the owner directs the contract to create an IDMS manager 
account for that public key. For deauthorization, the account record is marked as 
invalid. For each created manager, the owner specifies one or more descriptor fields. 
This should follow a standard nomenclature to enable automated evaluation of these 
fields by other entities (e.g., by RPs). 
Account managers: Account managers authorize user accounts in an analogous manner 
as the IDMS owner does for managers. User records are pseudonymous, they contain no 
identifying information. An account manager can only perform deauthorization on 
accounts they created. If a user’s private key is lost or stolen, the account manager may 
authorize a new account for the user using a new public key generated by the user and 
deauthorize the old account. The IDMS owner can require the account managers to 
perform identity proofing at some level, confirming that users are whom they claim to 
be. The contract can require a subset of the collected attributes to be posted to the user 
account. We refer to such attributes as ‘identity attributes’; they can be updated at any 
time by the account manager. 
Attribute managers: Attribute managers add attributes to users’ accounts. However, 
users must first grant them permission. They may revoke any attributes previously added. 
Users: Users may unilaterally delete non-identity attributes (to avoid them changing 
their identity). They may also delete their IDMS account completely. As mentioned 
previously, they must authorize any attribute manager to add attributes to their 
account. 
RPs: RPs keep a local copy of the contract state, extracted from the blockchain, and 
execute contract ‘view’ functions on that copy to enable reading the contract data. They 
do not have accounts on the contract or transact with the contract. 
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Fig. 1: IDMS Contract Design Relative to a Single User 
3 IDMS Attribute Field Design 
An important design element is the attribute field. Each field has a hash of a user attribute 
(put there by the applicable account manager or an attribute manager). If the actual 
attribute data is included to allow for easy user retrieval (which is not necessary), it is 
encrypted with a secret key that is then encrypted with the user’s public key to preserve 
user privacy. It is expensive to store data on a blockchain; if the data is large (e.g. video 
or image files), an off-blockchain location of the data may be posted to the attribute field. 
This might be used, for example, with images of physical credentials such as driver’s 
licenses, visas, social security cards, and passports. Note that the source of each attribute 
field is public to allow RPs to check the authority behind each user provided attribute. 
Field Name Field Description 
ManagerPublicKey Public key of manager that posted the 
attribute 
Identity Boolean to indicate if this is an identity attribute 
EncryptedSecretKey Secret key encrypted with the user’s public key 
Descriptor Encrypted description attribute data 
Data Encrypted attribute data 
Location Location for downloading data 
Hash Hash of the unencrypted descriptor and data 
Tab. 1: Contents of an Attribute Field 
To accomplish this, we use the attribute field structure shown in table 1. The 
‘ManagerPublicKey’ field is the public key of the manager that posted the attribute to the 
user’s account. This key can enable anyone to look up the manager in the IDMS using the 
publicly available blockchain data. Manager accounts contain only unencrypted 
attributes so that anyone can verify who posted an attribute. Note that only the contract 
owner can authorize a manager and populate its data fields, thus the unencrypted 
attributes within a manager’s account are considered authoritative. The ‘Identity’ field is 
a boolean indicating whether or not an attribute is an identity attribute. The 
‘EncryptedSecretKey’ is the secret key that was used to encrypt the attribute descriptor 
and data fields. The ‘Descriptor’ field is an encrypted field that explains what the attribute 
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data field contains
6
. The optional ‘Data’ field contains encrypted attribute data (these 
must be appended with a nonce prior to encryption to prevent guessing attacks when 
the attribute space is limited). The optional ‘Location’ field identifies a public location 
where the encrypted attribute data is available. The ‘Hash’ field is a hash of the 
unencrypted Data field appended with the unencrypted Descriptor field. This enables an 
RP to verify that a user is providing them the correct data and descriptor fields for a 
particular source. Note that if neither the Data or Location fields are provided, the user 
must maintain copies of the data for which the relevant hashes are posted. 
4 IDMS Core Functions 
In this section we will describe the core functions for our conceptual IDMS system: 1) 
authentication of users and 2) secure transmission of user attributes. A key design 
feature is that the user and RP can achieve this without any interaction with a third party 
(they don’t even need to transact with the smart contract). However, the user needs 
access to their attribute descriptors and data. These could be maintained by the user, 
downloaded from the blockchain (if stored in encrypted form in the user’s record), or 
downloaded and decrypted from the location specified in the location field of the user’s 
record. The user will also need to maintain their private key. This could be done in a 
hardware dongle to promote security and portability between devices, but could also be 
copied to multiple devices if desired. 
The RP will need access to a copy of the blockchain on which the contract is being 
executed 
(which is publicly available through the blockchain peer-to-peer network). They need 
only store the small portion relevant to the contract data. This must be a version recent 
enough as to have a hash of the attributes that the user will provide to the RP. Note that 
the RP does not need a blockchain account and the user will not need to transact with 
their blockchain account for these core functions (they do so only to maintain their 
contract user record). 
                                                                
6 Implementations of this should standardize on a set of descriptors and a format for the data field to promote 
automated processing of the attribute data. 
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4.1 IDMS Authentication 
 
Fig. 2: Example User to RP Authentication Function 
Our first core function enables U to authenticate to some RP1 given that RP1 can access 
U’s public key from the IDMS data on the public blockchain. This could be done through 
many approaches; here we present a method using Transport Layer Security (TLS). Our 
approach is similar to using TLS with client-side certificates, except that in our scenario 
no such client-side certificate exists. We achieve this by creating a TLS session, but 
within that session adding an additional challenge response mechanism followed by RP1 
generating a final symmetric key used for a second encrypted tunnel within the original 
TLS tunnel. 
With additional engineering, this tunnel within a tunnel approach could be replaced with 
the second ‘challenge response’ tunnel replacing the first TLS tunnel. 
More specifically for our example approach, U establishes a TLS tunnel with RP1. U then 
sends a message to RP1 claiming to own account ‘User 1’ in the IDMS. RP1 then accesses 
the IDMS account ‘User 1’ using its local copy of the blockchain and retrieves the posted 
public key. RP1 sends a random challenge to U encrypted with the public key posted on 
the IDMS account. U decrypts this with his private key and sends the result to RP. If the 
correct value was returned by U, then U has proved ownership of account ‘User 1’. 
Next, RP1 encrypts a symmetric key with U’s public key to use for the second encrypted 
tunnel and sends it to U. U obtains the symmetric key by decrypting with his private key. 
At this point both U and RP1 have mutually authenticated and have established an 
encrypted tunnel. This process is shown in figure 2. 
Note that in TLS, U produces the symmetric key used for the encrypted tunnel. 
However, in our secondary tunnel it is necessary that RP1 produce the symmetric key 
and encrypt it with U’s public key to avoid a man-in-the-middle attack. We must prevent 
RP1 from being able to masquerade as U while accessing some RP2 (because RP1 could 
answer RP2’s challenge using a response obtained by issuing the same challenge to U). 
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4.2 IDMS Attribute Transfer 
 
Fig. 3: User to RP Attribute Transfer Function 
Our second core function enables U to send attributes to RP (e.g., personal information 
necessary to complete some interaction). U obtains a decrypted copy of an attribute 
descriptor and data (from a local store, from an encrypted version stored in the user’s 
IDMS record, or from a server whose location is specified in the user’s IDMS record). U 
sends the descriptor and data to RP. RP hashes a concatenation of the data and descriptor 
and then verifies that the result matches a hash on the user’s IDMS record. The RP can 
then use the 
’ManagerPublicKey’ field in the matching attribute record to evaluate the attribute 
source. 
The manager accounts have unencrypted descriptor fields populated by the owner to 
enable an RP to automatically evaluate the authority of a manager account (e.g., that the 
manager issuing a drivers license really is the correct government agency). By the owner 
populating these public manager descriptor fields with a standard nomenclature, 
automated evaluation by RPs of a manager’s authority can be enabled. 
5 Example Use Case 
A government deploys an instance of our IDMS contract to a blockchain and is the owner. 
The owner authorizes account manager entities to perform identity proofing and add 
users. This is likely organizations already performing related activities, such as banks and 
local governments. A user Bob goes to his bank to have an account created in the IDMS. 
After providing the necessary documentation, he is granted an account. The owner also 
authorizes a university as an attribute manager with the descriptor fields ‘university’ and 
‘University of Corellia’. The former is a standardized descriptor to enable automated 
processing while the latter provides the name of the specific university (note that how to 
create ontologies of descriptors is out of scope of this work). Bob then requests that the 
University of Corellia post his degree to his IDMS account. Bob must first prove to the 
university using the core IDMS functions that 1) he owns the account and 2) that the 
account is for his identity by passing them identity attributes. Bob then transacts with the 
IDMS contract to give the university permission to post attributes to his account. The 
university gives Bob a digital image of his degree and also posts an attribute on Bob’s 
IDMS account with a hash of the digital image and a location field indicating where Bob 
can login and download the image off of university servers (in case Bob loses the 
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originally provided digital image). The university posts a second attribute indicating his 
grade point average (GPA). Since this is a small data field, it is encrypted along with a 
standard sized nonce and placed inside the attribute field. Bob can download this 
anytime off of the blockchain and use his private key to decrypt it. Bob then applies for a 
job with Ally, who wants proof that Bob graduated with a minimum GPA. Bob uses the 
core IDMS functions to prove that 1) he owns the IDMS account and 2) that the account 
contains the attributes necessary to convince Ally that Bob received a degree and 
graduated with a sufficient GPA. When Ally receives and verifies the attributes sent by 
Bob, she then checks the descriptor fields associated with the attributes. She verifies that 
the attributes were provided from a university using the first descriptor field and she 
reads off the specific university using the second descriptor field. 
6 Implementation Details and Empirical Study 
We implemented our IDMS using a smart contract running on the Ethereum platform 
[Eth] and created apps to interact with the smart contract. The contract implements all 
of the functionality described in section 2 and it contains methods to support the core 
functions described in section 4. Note that we left for future work the implementation of 
the off blockchain U to RP interactions. 
We tested all contract interactions described in sections 2 and 4. There were two types 
of interactions: transactions and views. Transactions are function calls that change the 
state of the contract; they thus must be submitted to the miners so that the changes can 
be stored on the blockchain. Views are function calls that look like transactions except 
that they do not alter the state of the contract; they thus can be executed locally by a 
node that has a copy of the blockchain. This makes their use free and fast. Table 2 lists 
the implemented functions. 
Function Type Permitted Role Gas Ether USD 
Add Manager Transaction Contract Owner 66632 2.0E-4 $0.03 
Delete Manager Transaction Contract Owner 17677 5.3E-5 $0.01 
Add User Account Transaction Account Manager 94562 2.8E-4 $0.05 
Delete User Account Transaction Account Manager 65020 2.0E-4 $0.03 
Add Attribute Transaction Managers / Users 182045 5.5E-4 $0.09 
Delete Attribute Transaction Managers / Users 33017 9.9E-5 $0.02 
Permit Attribute Manager Transaction Users 45151 1.4E-4 $0.02 
Deny Attribute Manager Transaction Users 15283 4.6E-5 $0.01 
Compare Hash View Public 0 0 $0 
View Attribute View Public 0 0 $0 
View Public Key View Public 0 0 $0 
Tab. 2: IDMS Contract Functions and Costs ($219.01 USD/Ether as of September 27, 2018) 
Note that the view functions are used by users and RPs for their interactions. The 
transaction functions are only used to set up the IDMS data structures. Thus, normal 
operation of our IDMS is extremely fast and does not cost anything. Creating user 
accounts and updating them with attributes costs a modest amount of funds (e.g., less 
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than $1 USD), but such activities are relatively rare compared to users interacting with 
RPs. 
7 Reasons to use a Smart Contract 
Use of the smart contract promotes trust in the system while providing a convenient 
vehicle for data distribution and update of a distributed and resilient data store. The 
smart contract code is publicly viewable and immutable, thus all participants know how 
it will operate and all entities are constrained to their roles. In particular, the owner is 
limited to just creation and deletion of manager roles; no access to user accounts is 
provided. The blockchain peer-to-peer network makes it convenient to distribute the 
IDMS data to participating entities. This also provides transparency and audit-ability for 
all IDMS transactions. Since the user to RP interactions don’t modify the blockchain, this 
transparency doesn’t cause a problem with user privacy. Lastly, the smart contract 
approach enables one to deploy an IDMS without the need to build and maintain any 
infrastructure. 
8 Security Properties 
We now summarize the security and privacy properties needed for our model and then 
explain how each security property is fulfilled by our IDMS and then discuss a residual 
weakness. The specific security properties are as follows: 
1. User attribute data is encrypted such that only the user can decrypt it. 
2. Users can securely share their attribute data with other parties. 
3. Users can unilaterally remove their attributes. 
4. Users can unilaterally remove their account. 
5. Users can have multiple accounts in order to hide their association with certain 
attribute managers. 
6. Account managers can only remove accounts that they created. Owners and 
attribute managers may not remove accounts. 
7. Account managers can only modify the identity attributes for accounts they 
created. 
8. Attribute managers may only place attributes if explicitly permitted by the 
relevant user. 
9. Owners may only add and remove account/attribute managers and update the 
IDMS contract code. 
10. IDMS contract code may only be updated by the owner following due process laid 
out in the contract (which is publicly available to all users of the contract). 
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11. Relying parties can trust account managers to perform identity proofing that 
binds real world entities to user accounts at a stated level of assurance. 
These security properties are provided primarily by the contract itself. Except under 
conditions documented within the contract, the code is immutable. The code is also 
public so that users can verify that these properties will be held. The contract directly 
enforces security properties 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. Key to this enforcement is for the 
smart contract to authenticate the party requesting a change. This is handled by the 
smart contract system, leveraging the accounts on the blockchain. Thus, our approach 
does not have to implement that part of the trust model. 
Property 1 is enacted by the account and attribute managers when they place attributes 
on a user account. There is nothing in the contract to prevent the posting of unencrypted 
attributes, but there is no motive for a manager to do so and there could be repercussions 
(e.g., the owner could remove the manager from the IDMS). 
Property 2 is enabled since our IDMS architecture provides a way for a user and RP to 
directly authenticate and pass attributes. All they need is to use a standard encrypted 
connection within which to execute our protocol. 
Property 5 can be provided by a user’s account manager. It is trivial to create additional 
accounts on blockchain systems, thus the user can do so easily. The account manager 
then simply creates an IDMS account with the public key associated with each of the 
user’s accounts. Based on our empirical work, there may be a modest cost to create each 
account (e.g., $0.05 USD). Also, we note that users are not required to pass RPs their 
identity attributes, enabling them to pass other attributes without revealing their 
identity. This can enable transactions to authenticate that a person has some attribute 
while staying anonymous. An example might be an online forum where only members of 
a certain organization can post messages but where the poster’s identity is to remain 
anonymous. 
Property 11 is achieved through the contract owner auditing the account managers to 
ensure that users are identity proofed at the required or advertised level of assurance. If 
account managers are non-compliant then the contract owner can revoke their accounts. 
Despite these security protections, we note an important limitation. An account 
managers could use their knowledge of a user’s identity attributes to create a clone 
identity for someone else. This is analogous to a government duplicating someone’s 
passport but including a different picture to enable someone to act as someone else. To 
our knowledge this problem exists in the related schemes (discussed next) whenever 
attribute managers act maliciously. 
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9 Related Work 
Many organizations are investigating using blockchain technology for identity 
management. Our approach is unique in providing a managed hierarchical approach with 
user selfsovereignty that can authoritatively validate attribute providers (or claim 
providers). 
uPort: uPort is an ‘open identity system for the decentralized web’ [uPo18]. uPort users 
create and manage self-sovereign identities by creating Ethereum accounts linked to a 
self-sovereign wallet. Being unmanaged and fully self-sovereign, there is no entity 
identity proofing of user accounts [Lun+17]. Our approach differs in that it provides a 
managed solution that still provides a level of self-sovereignty. This managed aspect can 
enforce validation on the claim providers not possible in completely unmanaged systems. 
SCPKI: The paper entitled ‘SCPKI: A Smart Contract-Based PKI and Identity System’ 
[AlB17] addresses the issue of rogue certificates issued by Certificate Authorities in 
traditional public key infrastructures. It proposes an alternative PKI approach that uses 
smart contracts to build a decentralized web-of-trust. The web-of-trust model is adopted 
from the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) system [Gar95]. SCPKI supports self-sovereign 
identity by defining a smart contract that allows users to add, sign, and revoke attributes. 
Users can sign other user’s attributes, gradually building a web-of-trust where users 
vouch for each others’ identity attributes. As with uPort, our approach differs in that it 
provides a managed model that can provides additional assurances on claims. 
Ethereum Improvement Proposal 725: Ethereum Improvement Proposal 725 [Vog17] 
(EIP-725) defines a smart contracts based identity management framework where each 
identity account is a separate smart contract. It supports self-attested claims and third 
party attestation. EIP-725 is augmented by EIP-735 [Vog], which specifies standard 
functions for managing claims and is supported by the ERC-725 Alliance [ERC]. An online 
ERC-725 DApp demonstration is available [0RI]. Our approach has similar capabilities but 
does not require every user and issuer of claims to have their own smart contract; ours 
is also a hierarchical managed model. 
Sovrin: Sovrin is ‘a protocol and token for self-sovereign identity and decentralized trust’ 
[Sov]. Its goal is to replace the need for PKIs and to create a Domain Name System (DNS) 
type system for looking up public keys to be used for identity management purposes 
through building a custom blockchain system. It is a permissioned based cryptocurrency 
with no consensus protocol, thus it has centralized ownership of the tokens. The 
managing Sovrin foundation must approve all nodes managing the blocks but is appealing 
for community involvement in running nodes. The token is a cryptocurrency so that value 
can be exchanged along with supporting identity transactions. Our approach differs in 
that it doesn’t require its own blockchain or cryptocurrency and can be executed on top 
of any smart contract system. 
Decentralized Identity Foundation: The Decentralized Identity Foundation (DIF)is a large 
partnership with the stated goal of building an open source decentralized identity 
ecosystem [Fou18]. The primary focus is on high level framework, organizational issues, 
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and standards. DIF plans to develop a broad, standards based ecosystem that supports a 
range of different implementations. 
Other Related Work: There are many other FIM related blockchain projects that cannot 
be referenced here due to space limitations. For the majority of them, the design details 
are unavailable or are in constant flux due to the nascent nature of this market. 
10 Conclusions 
We have demonstrated that it is possible to design a FIM system that enables direct user 
to RP authentication and attribute transfer without the involvement of a third party. We 
implemented this using a smart contract and identified the advantages of taking such an 
approach. We note that user to RP interactions do not require transactions with the 
contract, making them fast, free, and private. 
Our approach provides strong user self-sovereignty so that only the user can view and 
share their attribute data. However it is a managed system, intentionally not fully self-
sovereignty as with the cited related work to prevent users from unilaterally changing 
their own identity and to provide greater validation of attribute providers. Our limits on 
self-sovereignty also enable the IDMS to provide authoritative and consistent data 
about users and participating organizations. Our approach is thus suitable for a large 
organization to provide identity management services to its constituents (e.g., a 
government). Once established by a large entity, other organizations may leverage the 
IDMS to provide attributes to their users and gain the ability to identify and authorize 
users (but only with user permission). If the owner of the contract opens up the system 
to many account managers and attribute managers, this will create a powerful identity 
management ecosystem (as opposed to being a service only for a particular purpose). 
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